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Abstract:  This paper examines the similarities and differences between the Schlieffen Plan of 
1906 and the Manstein Plan of 1940.  These two plans for invading France were followed with 
varying degrees of faithfulness by Germany in World War I and II respectively.  Alfred von 
Schlieffen enjoyed a long and successful military career in the young German state that emerged 
from the long Prussian, military tradition.  He penned many theoretical writings that were 
influential in the years leading up to the Great War of 1914.  Schlieffen died in 1913, and 
therefore did not lead the German army in its invasion of France the following year.  His plan 
was attempted by Helmuth von Moltke in the invasion, despite some historians’ arguments that it 
had little bearing on the decision-making process that went into the invasion.  Germany failed in 
subduing France as Schlieffen had called for, and eventually lost the war.  During the interwar 
period however, German military thinkers innovated their tactics to successfully accommodate 
the principles that Schlieffen employed in his plan.  With the ascension of Adolf Hitler and the 
opening of hostilities in Europe, Germany looked to invade France once again.  In that conflict, 
Eric von Manstein was the strategist that developed the final plan for invasion.  While Manstein 
believed he was radically departing from the outdated Schlieffen Plan, this paper show that his 
plan was actually a modern continuation of Schlieffen’s strategic imperatives.  Beyond their 
plans for invasion, the paper will compare and contrast the two men as individuals.  Their 
backgrounds were different in many ways, but they were both engrossed in a rich tradition that 
manifested itself in their strategic writings.   
 
